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There  are  four  major  categories of  risk  that  arise  in  financial  institutions  in
general, and banks in particular: market risk, credit risk, legal risk, and operating risk
The focus of this paper is on market risk, which refers to any market-related factor (for
example,  an  interest  rate  change)  that  alters  the  value  of  a  position  in  a  financial
instrument  or portfolio  of instruments. The primary purpose is to  assess the different
regulatory regimes that have been either proposed, or already implemented, in order to
incorporate market  risk  explicitly into the  framework of  risk-based  minimum capital
standards for banks.
Section II offers a brief overview of the types of market risk, the rationale for
financial regulation in the form of minimum capital standards for banks, and the three
main regulatory approaches to measuring and setting capital against market risk. Sections
III, IV and V describe and assess the three basic approaches to the regulation of market
risk in banks:
*  the building bloc approach, which has been adopted in the EU in the form of
the CAD, and also appears in the standardized version of the Basle market risk
standard;
*  the internal models approach, which has been incorporated lately in the Basle
market risk standard;
*  the  precommitment  approach,  which  has  been  a  very  recent,  though
promising, arrival to the scene, and has not yet been officially discussed.
For a comprehensive  discussion  see Group of Thirty (1993).  In addition,  there is systemic  risk, which
occurs  if any of the previous  four risks,  individually  or in combination,  cause a disruption  to a firm,  that in
turn causes widespread  difficulties  at other firms, in other market segments,  or in the whole financial
system.2
The assessment is based on how well the delicate balance between fulfilling the aims of
regulation and not overburdening the financial system is preserved in each of the three
approaches. Finally, Section VI presents the main conclusions and draws the business
implications of the alternative regulatory approaches.3
11.  TIHE  REGULATION  OF MARKET  RISK  IN RANKS
11.1.  Types of Market Risk
There exist six fundamental market-type risks that can affect adversely the value
of a portfolio of securities2:
*  absolute price or rate (delta) risk - the exposure to a change in the value of a
transaction (f)  or portfolio (H) corresponding to a given change in the price
(S) of an underlying asset (A =  af  /  aS);
*  convexity or gamma risk - the exposure of the p,ortfolio's delta with respect to
the price of the underlying asset (F = h-r  / as  ). The greater the non-linearity
of the relationship between S and H (for example, if options are part of the
portfolio), the greater is gamma;
*  volatility or vega risk - typically associated with options, it is the exposure to
a change in f  or H resulting from a given change in the expected volatility (a)
of the price of an underlying asset (A = an / au);
*  time  decay  or  theta  risk  - typically  associated  with  options,  it  is  the
(inevitable) exposure to a change in  f  or HI  resulting from the passage of time
t (E1  =  a  /  at);
*  basis or correlation risk - the exposure to a change in f  or HI  resulting from
differences in the price performance of the derivatives it contains and their
hedges;
*  discount rate or rho risk - the exposure to a change in f  or HI  resulting from
the change in the interest rate (r) used for discounting future cash flows (rho =
aI8 /  or). It measures the sensitivity of the value of a portfolio to interest rates.
Each  of  the  six  risks  outlined  above  can  be  measured  across  the  different
maturities of the instruments in the portfolio. Once the portfolio has been decomposed
into its component parts -that is, once the market risk of each particular product is broken
down into its fundamental elements - the various risks can be aggregated and managed on
a net basis.
2  See Hull (1993).4
Modem  portfolio  theory  suggests  that  only  an  overall  portfolio  approach,
consisting of all the bank's  positions,  is the appropriate way to  measure risk. This  is
because the marginal contribution that a given position makes to total portfolio risk is a
function of what else there is in the portfolio, which is another way of saying that risk is
context-dependent.  Any  appropriate  system  for  setting  capital  requirements  should
recognize this basic tenet of portfolio theory. With respect to portfolios of derivatives 3
and  underlying  securities,  therefore,  the  relevant  market  risk  exposure  for  financial
institutions is their unhedged and undiversified portion, that is the residual exposure after
taking  account  of  the  netting  out,  of  correlation, and  of portfolio  diversification  of
positions in the same or different instruments.
II.2. Objectives and Techniques of Bank Regulation. and the Sources of Bank Risk4
1.  2.1. Objectives of Bank Regulation
A  market-based  financial  system  relies  on  the  existence  of  prudential,
organizational and protective regulations 5, in order to preserve the safety and soundness
of  the  financial  system,  to  ensure  its  smooth  functioning,  and  to  provide  adequate
protection to users of financial services.
The  particular  business  characteristics  of  banks  have  important  implications
regarding the need for their regulation. The need for bank regulation, given the objective
of maintaining confidence in the financial system, arises from the fact that banks are
3Derivative  instruments are securities whose value depends on the values of other basic underlying assets.
They fall into four main market groups: interest rate contracts, foreign exchange contracts, commodity
contracts, and equity contracts. The first two groups are the dominant and older segments of the market.
The instruments themselves consist of two basic types depending on their relationship with the underlying
asset prices, those with linear payoffs (for example, forward contracts) and those with non-linear payoffs
(for example, option contracts).
4See  Dale (November 1994).
5See  Vitas (1991).5
6 uniquely  vulnerable to  contagious (systemic) illiquidity  and insolvency  collapse , and
their failures can cause severe negative social externalities.
In order to prevent costly bank runs, authorities provide protection to depositors
through either formal deposit insurance schemes or informal support operations. Because
the  prospect  of  such  protection  tends  to  undermine  market  discipline  by  making
depositors less careful where they place their money (moral hazard), thus permitting risky
banks to  take advantage of this  safety net by choosing  lower capital ratios than they
would otherwise do, regulators seek to constrain risk-taking in order to limit the claims
on the deposit insurance fund and/or the taxpayer 7. The limited ability to price through
risk-related premiums, or ration through limited coverage, the benefits of the safety net
(especially the deposit insurance component), turn the government effectively into the
largest uninsured creditor of banks, forcing it to resort to the use of regulatory capital
8 requirements .
At  the  same time,  however,  the  fulfillment  of  the  aforementioned  prudential
regulatory objective is subject to the following constraints:
*  that  it  must  not  discriminate  between  institutions  providing  the  same
fimctions,  that  is  it  should  maintain  a  level  playing  field  ("competitive
neutrality");
*  that it must not distort portfolio choices by imposing substantial compliance
costs, and thus reduce the risk-transfer efficiency of the banking system. There
is therefore a trade-off between the cost of imposing capital requirements and
the costs of default . Given this trade-off, the optimal capital structure of a
financial institution  from a  social viewpoint  inevitably exposes  society  to
6This  inherent vulnerability comes from the liquid nature of banks'  liabilities (deposits)  and the illiquid
nature  of  their  assets  (commercial  loans), as  well  as  the  fact  that  banks'  assets  are  generally  worth
significantly less in liquidation than on a going-concern basis. See Diamond and Dybvig (June 1983).
S  see  Buser et al. (March  1981) for the notion of capital regulation as an  implicit premium for deposit
insurance.
8 Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) offer a similar justification: "The main concern of prudential regulation is
the solvency of banks... the goal of regulation is to provide active representation for depositors."
9  For  example,  Berger et  al.  (1995) state: "Thus,  capital regulation  involves a  tradeoff  between  the
marginal  social  benefit  of reducing  the  risk  of  the  negative  externalities from  bank  failures  and  the
marginal social cost of diminishing intermediation."6
some  risk'0. Under the present piecemeal approach to  capital standards,  a
more  limited condition to  the  above is that  the  standard has risk  weights
consistent with the individual positions'  contributions to the risk component
for which the standard is being applied.
Finally, the international harmonization of rules is another important objective nowadays,
in order to prevent regulatory arbitrage and to reduce compliance costs.
II.2.2. Techniques of Bank Regulation
The techniques of bank regulation that have evolved reflect the aforementioned
regulatory objectives. Due to their inherently illiquid nature, banks typically have access
to a lender of last resort facility, which is also related to the banks' important role in the
payments  system and in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. In addition,
there are other, implicit or explicit, measures of the regulatory safety net which protect
the  safety  and  soundness  of  banks.  On  the  need  to  maintain  solvency  in  difficult
economic times, as well as to prevent moral hazard behavior arising from the existence of
the safety net, it is the function of bank capital to provide a permanent cushion against
unexpected losses, enabling individual banks, as well as the whole financial system, to
survive.
The concept of capital adequacy relates the riskiness of a bank to the amount of
capital,  with  minimum  capital  standards  being the  minimum  permissible  amount  of
capital in a bank. Risk-based capital standards seek to replace depositor pressures to limit
bank risk-taking with regulator-required increases in capitalization as a bank's  operations
become riskier. In this regulatory definition of capital, bank supervisory authorities must
define the balance sheet instruments that  comprise the capital resources of  a bank,  in
II,  12 order to determine compliance with the minimum capital standards
°  In contrast to the well-known Modigliani-Miller irrelevance proposition, the many distortions that exist
in financial markets (such as taxes,  asymmetric information, and transaction costs) mean that additional
capital requirements are costly since the weighted average cost of capital increases with the capital ratio.
The implication is that capital requirements should not be arbitrarily large.
I  Historically, measures of capital standards were based on various leverage ratios, usually expressing the
amount of capital as a percentage of the bank's total assets. The growth of off-balance sheet activity and7
I. 2.3. Sources of Risk for Banks
In  their  traditional  banking  business  - lending  financed  by  deposits  from
customers or the wholesale markets - the main sources of risk for banks, as well as their
regulation, were credit risk in their loan books and internal control systems.  Credit risk
was accounted for in the 1988 Basle Capital Accord, which provided for the first time
minimum credit risk-based capital standards. The Basle framework now  serves as the
standard for all banks in numerous countries within and outside the G-1O  group.
Banks may also be exposed to securities market risk because they have lent to
investment firms and they hold securities as collateral, because they engage in trading
business off their own balance sheets, or because they have securities subsidiaries or
affiliates. Whereas, though, the first  of these exposures can be dealt  with,  at least  in
principle,  through  regulatory  limits  on  large  exposures,  the  other  two  exposures
inextricably link the bank's  solvency to its securities operations. In effect, therefore, the
bank's capital stands behind its securities unit.
Recent  attempts to  incorporate market  risk  into the  framework  of  risk-based
capital standards are largely based on the deregulation of interest rates, the dismantling of
capital  controls, and  the  relaxation  of banks'  authorized range  of  activities 13. These
developments  have  permitted  the  rapid  growth  in  securities,  foreign  exchange,  and
derivatives (especially over-the-counter or OTC) trading by banks. Whereas exchange-
traded derivatives are extensively regulated by government agencies, it is the unregulated
nature of OTC derivatives trading, as well as its fast growth 4, that is causing concern.
the existence of widely divergent classes of assets and instruments, which can greatly vary bank risks, has
rendered the use of total assets an increasingly imperfect proxy for the relative risks of an institution.
12  Modem capital regimes often classify regulatory capital into two Tiers: "core" capital, incorporating the
highest elements (for example, equity and disclosed reserves); and "secondary" or "supplemental" capital,
incorporating elements that have the capacity to absorb unexpected losses but are less permanent in nature
- for example, various debt instruments such as subordinated debt. See The World Bank (August  1992),
and Berger et al. (1995) for a discussion on the role and concept of capital in financial institutions.
13  See Weston and Gray (December 1994).
14  The standard  way  to judge  the  size  of  OTC  derivatives  is by  reference  to  the  notional  amount
outstanding for particular types of derivatives. The notional amount is the face value of the principal of the8
Because trading-book exposures are taken with  a view  to resale  or  short-term profit,
rather than to holding the securities until maturity, the assets are treated as short-term and
valued on a mark-to-market basis - the current price at which they could be sold in the
market.
Though  it is widely agreed that the risks for end users or dealers  involved in
derivative activities are not new, derivatives business has two special  attributes which
distinguish it from more conventional financial activity 15: increased complexity and rapid
risk  transformation.  The  result  is  reduced  transparency  of  financial  markets  and  an
inability to correctly assess the risks of a financial institution. The concerns here are that
firstly, trading desk activities may lead to rapid changes in bank capital because of the
potential volatility  of the trading portfolio's  value; and  secondly, the failure of  large
banks involved in derivatives may have systemic implications. In effect, the heavy social
costs  associated  with  bank  failures  are  carried  over  into  the  securities  markets.
Globalization,  by  increasing  the  potential  for  transmission  of  cross-border  financial
contagion, has expanded those risks. This has been a primary motivation for the explicit
introduction of market risk into risk-based capital adequacy standards.
11.3.  Alternative Approaches to Market Risk Capital Standards
There are three main regulatory approaches to the measurement of, and the capital
provisions  for, market risk 16' 7. The first one,  which  is the Building Blocs  Approach
(BBA), consists of a  single model to  be applied to all banks. It  is a set of rules  that
assigns risk charges to specific instruments and crudely accounts for selected portfolio
underlying contract on which a derivative instrument is based. This is a misleading indicator of the size of
derivatives transactions because most cash flows arising from such transactions are small compared with
notional principal. The latter is useful, though, as a crude measure of the relative importance of one type of
derivative compared with another, or as a measure of the growth in activity for one instrument.
15  See Dale (January 1995).
16  Other approaches for setting position (market) risk requirements, such as the US SEC's Comprehensive
Approach and the UK Simplified Portfolio Approach are not discussed here, primarily because they apply
to securities firms only. See Dimson and Marsh (July 1995).
17 The following description is based on Kupiec and O'Brien (December 1995).9
effects on banks'  risk exposures. This  approach is characterized by a "building  bloc"
framework,  a  framework  it  shares  with  the  1988 Basle  Accord  credit  risk  capital
standards. Two regulatory frameworks, those of the Capital Adequacy Directive (CAD)
of the European Union and of the Basle Standardized Measure (BSM), incorporate this
approach. In both cases, the required market risk capital will supplement the regulatory
capital required under the current credit risk capital standards.
A  second  approach  is the  Internal  Models Approach  (IMA), whereby  capital
charges would be based on market risk estimates from banks'  internal risk measurement
models.  The bank  would use  its  proprietary risk  measurement model  to  estimate  its
trading risk exposure which, when multiplied by a certain scaling factor as a measure of
regulators'  conservatism, would become the basis for the regulatory capital charge for
market  risk. Regulators would also  impose a  number of standardizing restrictions  on
banks' internal models, in order to ensure rough comparability across banks that use this
approach. The IMA has been adopted recently by the Basle Committee as an alternative
measure to the BSM.
The third and  latest proposal is the Precommitment Approach (PA),  based  on
work  done  by  two  Federal  Reserve  economists, Kupiec  and  O'Brien'8 . Under  this
approach, which has not yet been officially suggested or operationally described in great
detail, each bank precommits to a maximum loss exposure over a designated horizon. The
maximum loss commitment becomes the bank's  market risk capital charge. If the bank
incurs trading losses in excess of its capital commitment, it is subject to penalties which
may include fines, a capital surcharge in future periods, or other regulatory disciplinary
measures. The next three  Sections will describe and assess in greater detail these three
approaches respectively.
18  See, for example,  Kupiec and  O'Brien,  "Model Alternative" in Risk magazine, Vol. 8, No.  6 (June
1995).10
I11 THE BUILDING  1BLOC'S  A'PPROACH
111.  1. The Capital Adequacy Directive (CAD)
11.1.11.  Background to the CAD
The EU, eager to put in place a key element of its Internal Market program by the
target date of end-1 992, decided to proceed unilaterally on the regulation of market risk
with the CAD, though it did consult closely with the Basle Committee. A key provision,
however, allows the CAD to be reviewed within three years of coming into effect (that is,
by 31 December 1998), in the light of the evolving international consensus.
III.  1.2. Aims of the CAD
The aims of  the CAD  are to  ensure that  all  EU  investment firms  and  credit
institutions (banks) hold  sufficient capital to cover the market  risks to which they are
exposed, and to promote the leveling of the playing field between different EU countries'
banks and investment firms. To achieve these objectives, the CAD establishes 9:
c  a common framework for measuring and monitoring a range of market related
risks;
*  a large exposures regime for market risks;
*  minimum capital requirements for investment firms and credit institutions;
*  a definition of capital in order to meet the capital requirements.
III 1.  3. The Concept of the Trading Book
Central  to  the  CAD  is  the  concept  of  the  trading  book.  The  trading  book
comprises  both  the  short-term  proprietary  position  taken  by  a  bank  in  financial
instruments for its own account, and its exposures relating to the provision of financial
services to customers - for example, agency business. On the other hand, the banking
9  See Price Waterhouse (1994).11
book comprises all other transactions - for example, lending and other types  of credit
activities, and long-term investments.
The trading book approach permits banks to engage freely in securities activities
either  directly, or through  securities subsidiaries. In either case, the banking business
20 activity is separated from the capital adequacy provisions of the trading book  . Position
risk  within  the  trading  book  is  the  principal target  of  supervision  under  the  CAD.
However, the Directive also contains additional protective measures via an extra capital
set-aside in relation to:
*  settlement/delivery,  counterparty  and  large  exposures  risks,  in  activities
subject to market risks -that is, arising from the trading book only;
*  foreign exchange and commodities risks, arising from all business activities.
Market risk that arises in banking book debt and equity instruments is not considered.
III. 1.  4. Frameworkfor Measurement of Market Risk andfor  Capital Requirements21
Under this  approach, capital charges are determined separately for each of four
major market risk categories (interest rate, foreign exchange, equity, and commodities)
and are then aggregated. The fundamental structure is therefore additive, while different
procedures are used for each category to determine the respective capital charge.
The CAD  divides  market risk  on  both  debt  and  equity instruments  into two
components in order to calculate the required capital. The first is specific risk and the
second is general risk. Specific risk relates to circumstances particular to an issuer/issue,
for  example the deterioration in  its  financial position. General risk  factors affect  the
22 market or the economy as a whole, for example changes in monetary policy
20  See  Dale (November 1994) for a  discussion on the choice  of regulatory regimes available to those
negotiating the CAD. Briefly, these were: the separation (Glass-Steagall) model, the universal bank (mixed
banking and securities firm) model, the firewall (restrictions on intra-group transactions) model, and the
trading book model. The last of these emerged as a compromise between the different EU countries.
21  For a worked example of the CAD's methodology, see Price Waterhouse (1994).
22  The market risk capital charges for debt and equity instruments in the trading book would substitute for
the credit risk weighted requirements that were applied to those instruments.12
Portfolio risk for debt and equity risk categories is therefore a weighted average of
the sum of their gross (for general risk) and net (for specific risk) positions. With regards
to  specific risk, weights  are placed according to  the quality measures of the  security
(issuer, maturity, rating). With regards to general risk, positions are aggregated and netted
within each of 13 time bands. Net positions in each time band are then multiplied by a
risk weight and aggregated across time bands. The netting of positions within a time band
and  aggregation  of  weighted  positions  across  time  bands  - the  so-called  cashflow
mapping - assumes perfect correlation among risk-free debt instrument  price changes.
These are later  adjusted for imperfect correlations across maturity bands through  so-
called 'horizontal disallowances'  capital charges, and basis risk within a maturity band
through so-called 'vertical disallowances' capital charges.
Interest rate risk capital charges are separately determined for positions in each
currency unit and are then aggregated across currency units using spot exchange rates to
determine the  total  capital requirement  for interest  rate  risk. Foreign  exchange  (FX)
exposures, which are levied on the total firm's  activities (that is, both banking and trading
books) are assessed an 8% capital charge (once the net FX position exceeds 2% of the
firm's own funds) on the larger of the sum of net short/long cash and forward positions in
each  currency.  Alternatively,  banks  may use  a  'backtesting'  method  for  FX  capital
requirement, based on estimates of FX losses that would have occurred with their current
positions,  using  their  own  VAR  models  (see  section  IV.2.),  in  the  last  five  years.
Commodity capital charges are generally 15% of the net position in each commodity
except gold, whereby the FX requirements apply.
Derivative contracts in FX, interest rates and equities, are treated as if they were
outright positions in the underlying securities, thereby allowing the relevant general and
specific risk requirements to apply. Firm commitment contracts (futures, options, swaps)
are  expressed  as  long  and  short  positions  in  the  underlying  instruments 23. Options
23  For example, a futures contract to receive $1 million in 5 year Treasury notes in I month is treated as
the sum of:
*  a long position in a 5 year (plus one month) note valued at its current market value, which is
slotted in the 4-5 year maturity band;
*  a short position in $1 million 1-month T-bills, slotted in the 1-3 month band.13
position risk may be included in capital measures under either the delta plus method (the
value of the underlying instruments is weighted by the options'  deltas, adjusted for vega
and gamma risk) or the cave out method (risk is determined over a specified range of
underlying security values and return volatilities). The resulting capital charge is added to
those for other components of the portfolio. The division into specific and general risks
for debt and equity risk categories, the calculation of separate capital requirements for
each risk category, and their simple addition, is therefore what characterizes the BBA.
II.11.5. Qualifying Capital Under the CAD
Since capital requirements for market risk tend to be far more volatile than those
of credit risk, a more flexible and less permanent source of capital was introduced. Tier 3,
24 a new type of capital made up of short-term subordinated debt under a 'lock-in'  clause
is eligible for inclusion in regulatory capital. This must have an initial maturity of at least
two years. Tier 3 capital is only available to cover the risks dealt in the CAD - that is,
trading book and foreign exchange requirements - while it is also subject to maximum
limits in relation to Tier 1 and to total regulatory capital. Institutions will have to comply
with the Directive requirements on a continuous basis meaning that daily monitoring and
compliance mechanisms must be in place.
111.2.  The Basle Standardized Measure (BSM)
II.12.  1. Description of the BSM
The BSM is one of the two approaches suggested by the Basle Committee in its
proposed market risk standard (see Section IV.2.). Like the CAD, the general approach
proposed here  is based  on the  BBA, whereby the capital  charge calculated for  each
position is the sum of two components: a specific risk requirement and  a general risk
requirement. The capital charges thus calculated are intended to substitute for the credit
risk weightings which have hitherto been applied to trading book items (debt and equity
24  The clause prevents the payment of principal or interest in the event a bank falls below a given threshold
percentage of the required market risk-based capital.14
securities  and  derivatives) in  deriving  capital  adequacy  ratios. The  investment  book
would continue to be subject to the provision of the 1988 Capital Accord.
III.2.2. Differences between the CAD and the BSM
Both the BSM and the CAD are minimum standards, leaving national authorities
considerable latitude to apply additional requirements generally or to specific institutions.
There are only a small number of divergences between the CAD and the BSM, the main
25 ones being
*  with regards to the scope of coverage, the BSM is drawn up from a banking
perspective, that is, it is only for banks (including bank holding groups) doing
securities business. The CAD, in contrast, is targeted primarily at investment
firms  and  then  by  extension  at  banks  undertaking  securities  business.
Moreover, the CAD is much more comprehensive - for example, it contains
provisions relating to underwriting exposures and settlement risks which are
not covered under the BSM;
*  with  regards to  regulatory capital, the BSM, despite having a  more lenient
lock-in clause, is more restrictive on the use of short-term Tier 3 (subordinated
loan) capital, as a percentage of original Tier 1 capital (own funds);
- with regards to gross equity positions, a more stringent approach to specific
risk is adopted under the BSM, which does not allow the capital requirement
(set  at 8%, or  4%  for highly  liquid and  well-diversified portfolios)  to  be
lowered to 2%, as permitted under the CAD;
*  with regards to foreign exchange risk, the BSM is more demanding, under its
basic approach, in the capital charge it sets for an institution's net open foreign
exchange position.
III.2.3. Overall Minimum Risk-based Capital Requirements
The combination of the Basle capital accords for credit and market risks means
that banks will have to satisfy the following overall minimum capital requirements:
*  the credit risk requirements from the application of the  1988 accord to the
banking book - that is, excluding debt and equity securities in the trading book
and all positions in commodities, but including the credit counterparty risk on
all OTC derivatives in both trading and banking books;
25  See Price Waterhouse (1994) and Hall (September 1995).15
the capital charge for market risk as a result of the application of market risk-
based requirements, whether using the BSM or the IMA (see section IV.2.).
IIIJ.  Analysis
IlI. 3.1. Disadvantages of the BBA
A  number of  criticisms can be  brought  up  against the  BBA,  as  it  has  been
26 encapsulated in the CAD and the BSM  .Firstly, splitting a bank's business into a trading
and a non-trading component, and applying separate and distinct definitions of capital to
each, appears to make little prudential sense:
*  requiring the firm to hold different amounts of capital if it has holdings in a
particular security in both its trading and banking books is not consistent with
the stated aim of regulation as being neutral between different transactions.
Moreover, the trading book concept is open to regulatory arbitrage in the form
of switches between the banking and trading books. Given the existence of
incentives because of the differential capital rules, banks can be motivated to
27, 28 present their longer-term investments as trading assets  . The implication is
that for most  large borrowers of investment grade status,  securities market
financing,  especially  securitization,  becomes  relatively  cheaper  to
conventional bank borrowing. To the extent that the process is due to arbitrary
differences in the regulatory treatment of different types of debt issued by the
same borrower, important inefficiencies and distortions are introduced;
*  artificially carving up the bank's  business in two parts is not  efficient in a
portfolio sense since it ignores the possibility of transactions undertaken in the
trading book which incidentally offset (hedge against) the exposures in the
banking book.  Hedging instruments falling  within the trading book  would
continue to be subject to the credit risk-based capital requirements;
*  while the trading book segregates assets used for trading purposes, as well as
the regulatory  capital used to  back such assets, it does not  segregate non-
26  See Dale (November 1994).
27  Assume that  8% regulatory capital cover is required for loans and (say) 2%  for securities. Assume
further that 50% of this capital is provided in the form of equity and that the target return on equity for the
bank  is  10%. A  universal bank will then  need to earn  0.4% on  its  loan assets, but  only 0.1%  on  its
securities assets, in order to meet its target return on equity.
28  On the other hand though, many banks prefer to avoid the marking-to-market that comes with a switch
to a trading book because of the fluctuations it causes to their earnings. Therefore, there are limits to the
benefits of this type of regulatory arbitrage.16
capital liabilities. This means that a mixed securities and banking business -
for example, a  universal bank - is free to  use its  deposit base  to  fund its
securities  trading  book.  The  problem  here  is  that,  since  bank  deposits
generally enjoy  deposit protection,  deposit rates do  not  incorporate  a risk
premium that adequately reflects the risks a bank incurs. In a sense, banks'
activities are being subsidized if banks are permitted to use protected deposits
to fund their trading book. This in turn provides incentives for excessive risk-
taking (moral hazard) within the trading book29.  The separation of risk-bearing
from risk-taking is one reason why banks are subject to  such extensive and
conservative  regulation  on  the  asset  side.  Moreover,  deposit  funding  of
securities business gives EU banks an important competitive advantage over
investment firms;
The mandatory 'lock-in'  provision applicable to short-term subordinated debt
does not provide the protection that is intended. A bank forced to invoke this
clause in respect of its trading book, in effect defaulting, would immediately
become suspect in the eyes of the marketplace, thereby risking a deposit run.
Accordingly, a bank would feel compelled to make good any capital shortfall
arising on its trading book so as to prevent the triggering of the lock-in. The
presence of 'outside'  short-term subordinated debt to back the trading book
therefore increases the solvency risk for the bank, because such debt cannot in
practice be used to absorb losses on the trading book. On the other hand, a
parent bank that provides 'inside'  subordinated debt to its securities subsidiary
would have to hold bank capital against this exposure. There is therefore little
purpose in segregating a bank's securities assets for capital adequacy purposes
if the risks in this part of the business cannot be segregated from the bank.
Secondly, splitting market risk into specific and general risk provides an effective
basis for allowing the offsetting of long and short positions. However, by splitting market
risk  in  this  way,  the  implication  is that  the  two  elements are  independent  (that  is,
uncorrelated). If that is true, then mathematically total market risk should therefore be the
square root of the sum of the squares of the two components, rather than their simple
addition. In adopting the latter approach, it can only be presumed that the Commission
considered it to be a sufficient approximation for total market risk.
29  These difficulties could be avoided or at least alleviated, in principle, if there existed funding rules that
prevented or limited the use of deposits to support a bank's  trading book and instead required funding in
the form of outside 'risk money', the cost of which would depend on the perceived risk characteristics of
the institution concerned. For such a funding rule to be effective, however, it would be necessary to have
banks'  securities activities conducted through separately incorporated entities.17
Moreover, complaints have also been directed at various rules within those two
categories:
*  the CAD rules treat all equities equally, recognizing no qualitative distinctions
such as the identity or credit rating of the issuer, and the market on which the
equity is quoted or traded;
*  the CAD and BSM capital provisions for foreign exchange, large exposures
(especially  underwriting),  and  derivative  transactions,  are  seen  as  being
excessively high;
. neither  the  CAD  nor  the  BSM  indicate  specific  levels  of  capital  to  be
maintained against interest rate risk on the banking book, perhaps in the belief
that the existing credit risk framework is effective in capturing those risks;
*  positions of the same sign in different securities or maturities are not assigned
any diversification benefits.
These criticisms are the inevitable result of the adoption of a set of rule-of-thumbs that
crudely assigns risk charges to specific instruments. Risk is treated as though it can be
evaluated separately by security type and maturity, in contrast to modem portfolio theory.
The result is that:
*  firms hold too much capital because some of the benefits of diversification
and hedging are ignored;
*  effective  risk  management  is  not  encouraged  since  it  is  not  aligned  to
industry's  best practice, that of sophisticated in-house risk measurement and
management models;
*  it will be difficult to adapt the proposal to new products, because of its static
30 nature
Finally, another controversial issue with respect to the CAD, and not discussed
here,  is  the  desirability  and  feasibility  of  a  level  playing  field  between  banks  and
investment firms in EU countries. The reason is the different views taken by regulators
30  See Brickell, "New Tools for New Rules" in Risk magazine, Vol. 7, No. I (January  1994).18
for the two types of financial institutions, focusing more on solvency and systemic risk
for banks, and liquidity and customer protection for securities firms 31.
III 3.2. Conclusion
Much will depend on the manner in which these provisions are implemented by
the national authorities, as well as on the institutional framework, particularly differences
in accounting practices 32. One important advantage of the BBA that is readily apparent,
based on the experience of the 1988 Basle credit Accord and given the similarity in the
methodology that these two approaches share, is the willingness of many countries to
implement regulations, such as this one, that are relatively simple to follow.
However, it is fair to say that the BBA is not a very efficient approach to measure,
and take provisions against, market risk. The 'one-size-fits-all'  approach does not reflect
the diversity of portfolios and strategies that exist, nor does it keep up with changing
circumstances.  Moreover,  though  the  opportunity  for  gaming  the  rules  by  financial
institutions  is present  in  all  types  of regulations,  the BBA  is particularly  vulnerable
because of its crudeness. The fundamental problem is that the procedure for measuring
market risk is crude and it is at variance with industry best practice in risk measurement,
the use of sophisticated in-house models (see next Section).
3  For a critical discussion on this issue, see Dale (November 1994).
32  Price Waterhouse (1994) lists the following accounting considerations: the extent to which assets and
liabilities can be offset against each other; the rules governing hedge accounting; the valuation of securities
positions;  the methodologies  employed  in marking  derivatives to market; and  the  application  of NPV
accounting techniques to value and report financial instruments.19
|I'rilE  l..INTERNAL  NMO)DEl.S  AP'PROACHI-  j
IV. 1. Market Risk Measurement: Value-at-risk Models and Stress Tests
IV]...  VAR Models
In the past, banks have usually measured the risks in individual parts  of their
trading books separately. Nowadays, however, they are increasingly moving towards  a
whole trading book approach using a value-at-risk (VAR) model, which is a statistical
approach to  the evaluation of market risk. The aim of the VAR  model is to  calculate
consistently the loss, with a specified probability over a specified holding period of time,
that a bank might  experience on its portfolio from an adverse market movement. For
example, with  a  confidence interval of  97.5%, corresponding to  about two  standards
deviations from the mean, any change in portfolio value over one day resulting from an
adverse market movement will not exceed a specific amount x, given the relationships
between assets holding over the observation period. VAR should therefore encompass
changes in all major market risk components (see Section 11.  1  .).
There are three main VAR approaches 33. Firstly, under the variance/covariance
(or correlation) approach, a bank uses summary statistics on the magnitude of past price
volatilities and correlations between price movements to estimate likely potential losses
in its trading portfolio. This can be done by placing equal weights on all past observations
or,  in order  to  give more weight to  more recent observations so that  large jumps  in
34 volatility/correlation in the distant past are avoided, by using unequal weighting
Secondly, under the (historical) simulation approach, a bank bases its expectations
of potential future losses on calculations - using data on past price movements - of the
loss that  would  have been  sustained on that  book  in  the  past.  The  main  difference
between the two  is that, with  the first  approach the  confidence interval is calculated
33  See Jackson (May 1995), and "Value At Risk", a Risk magazine Special Supplement (June 1996).
34  The two most used methods for unequal weighting are the Garch (General Autoregressive Conditional
Heteroscedasticity)  family  of models  and  the exponentially-weighted  moving  averages  method.20
statistically 35, whereas with the second approach it is observed. The latter approach is,
therefore, computationally more intensive and its results are susceptible to the frequency
of rare events in the historical observation period, as well as to its length.
Finally, under the Monte Carlo (or stochastic simulation) approach, a bank tests
the value of the portfolio under a large sample of randomly chosen combinations of price
scenarios, whose probabilities are based on historical experience. This method is more
flexible and is particularly useful  in measuring the risk in  instruments with  nonlinear
price characteristics, but it is less frequently used because of its time and cost demands.
Banks  can use  any  of  the  three  approaches to  allocate  capital  between  their
various  operations.  So  far,  there  is  no  industry  consensus  on  the  best  method  for
calculating VAR. As with  any statistical model, VAR  depends on assumptions whose
choice is dictated by the user's awareness and aversion to them.
The  issue  of  correlations  is  extremely important  for  VAR  models.  Different
36 approaches capture different correlations  . Measuring correlation is important because of
the  empirically  well-established  'fat'  tails  in  the  distribution  of  market  returns.
Leptocurtosis means that measures of VAR based on a normal distribution of returns will
likely understate actual VAR.
In addition, during extreme market movements, correlations change significantly
which has implication for VAR measurement. During the October 1987 equity markets
crash, the correlation between markets was close to 1 - all markets moved together. There
is little benefit at such times from market diversification, but considerable benefit from
having long and short positions in different markets. At other times - for example, after
the 1987 Nikkei equity index crashed alone - the correlation between some markets was
closer to zero, or even -1. The benefits from diversification then would much exceed the
benefits from hedging.
35  For example, one version of the first approach assumes that the returns on risk factors are normally
distributed, the  correlations between factors  are constant, and the  delta of  each  portfolio constituent  is
constant. All of these can be criticized as unrealistic.
36  The variance/covariance  approach, for  example, is based on  average  correlations calculated  for the
whole data period, while the simulation approach reflects the actual correlations on particular days.21
IV1.I2. Stress Testing
For the risk profile of a trading book, and for day-to-day risk management, it is
short-term  'normal'  correlations that  are  important because  of  the  daily  marking  to
market  of  positions.  However,  for the  regulators,  it  is  instances  of  extreme  market
pressure, when correlations can change dramatically and market liquidity drains, which
are the focus. The emphasis therefore of regulation is on the tails of the distribution of
price movements, that is on adverse extreme events. This is also the explicit aim of stress
tests, the other main market risk measurement device.
Stress tests calculate the possible extent on a trading book of exposures under
extreme  market  movement  scenarios  or,  more  generally,  when  some  of  the  basic
assumptions  underlying  the  VAR  model  are  violated. The  trading  book  is  revalued
according to imposed hypothetical, albeit improbable, parameters, rather than according
to summary statistics calculated from past data as in the variance/covariance approach. As
such, there is no standard way to do stress testing since it involves experimenting with the
limits of a risk model.
IV.2. The Basle Internal Model Approach
IV 2.1. Overall Description
As a result of the public criticism of the BSM proposals, the Basle Committee
37 has,  in  its  final  market  risk  standard decision  ,  agreed to  include  the  IMA  as  an
alternative approach to the BSM. The market risk standard covers the trading account of
internationally active banks only. There is going to be a two-year implementation period,
followed by the adoption of the standard, on a voluntary basis depending on the decision
by the country's regulatory authorities, on the first of January 1998.
The assumptions underlying the BIMA are that banks are in a better position than
regulators to devise models that accurately measure risk exposure over a holding period
of concern to regulators, and that the regulatory authority can verify that each bank's
37  See Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (January 1996).22
model is providing such an accurate measure. In effect, the regulators 'piggyback'  on a
bank's  existing risk-management model to determine levels of risk capital to be held. At
the heart of this approach lies the VAR model described above.
IV 2.2. The IMA Process 38
Setting capital adequacy  standards under  this  regime is  a  three-stage process.
Firstly,  the  regulators  set  the  quantitative  standards  (risk  parameters)  for  capital
calculation which are the following39:
*  the model must cover all material risks in the trading book and must have a
minimum  number  of  thirteen  (six  for  United  States  banks,  under  the
corresponding Fed proposal) risk factors (maturity bands). Moreover, it must
be  able  to  account  for  the  non-linear  pricing  characteristics  of  option
instruments;
*  a  99% one-sided 'conservative'  confidence interval, in order to account for
adverse movements only. This amounts to a risk estimate of three standard
deviations  away from the mean of a normal distribution  of portfolio value
changes;
*  a ten trading-day (that is, two weeks) holding period. This has been imposed
to  extend the period sufficiently to be  of interest to regulators, and can be
justified  by appealing to concerns about illiquidity and the inability to wind
down positions during extreme market movements;
*  a minimum of one year as the observation period for historical data to be used
in calculating volatility, to be updated at least once a quarter. This is intended
to resolve problems of differential volatilities and correlations arising from the
choice of the size of the sample period;
*  all correlations are allowed, both within and across different asset classes (risk
categories), to be estimated with equally-weighted daily data;
38  See the Federal Register (25 July 1995) for a more detailed description of the BSM and the BIMA as
proposed to be applied to the United States.
39 Quantitative standards were placed in an attempt to make consistent estimates across institutions. This
was in response to important differences in model practice, identified when the Basle Committee compiled
and distributed a  test portfolio to fifteen banks  in the major  G-10 countries in order to get  their  VAR
estimates. Moreover, the  standards aim to address some  overall measurement  shortcomings.  See Basle
Committee on Banking Supervision (April 1995).23
*  since there is no economic model for determining how to extrapolate daily
VARs  to  the  ten  trading-day  holding  period,  that  regulatory  capital
requirement is scaled up by the square root of time. Options exposures, which
have nonlinear payoffs as a function of time, must be measured directly by
considering the variance of two-week price  movements.  This can  be done
through nonlinear approximation methods involving higher-order risk factor
sensitivities (gamma risk), volatility changes (vega risk), and spread risk;
*  the bank's  capital charge is based  on the larger of the bank's  previous day
VAR  estimate, and  the  average  of  its  risk  estimates  over  the  prior  sixty
business days subject to a multiplication factor. This minimum scaling factor
is included as a measure of the regulators' conservatism regarding the model's
capital estimates.  The proposed minimum  value is  3,  making  the  implied
holding period equivalent to  90 days of unhedged exposure. The multiplier
can be  increased if the supervisor is not  satisfied with  the accuracy of  the
estimates (see 'plus factor' below);
*  an additional capital charge for the specific (idiosyncratic) risk of trading book
debt and equity positions is levied. This is equal to one-half of the specific risk
capital charge as calculated under the BSM;
*  for verifying risk estimates, a one-day backtesting methodology is proposed to
be used quarterly, based on the frequency of realized daily losses exceeding
40 the model's predicted losses at the 1% critical values  . Banks are required to
add to the multiplication factor a 'plus  factor'  directly related to the ex-post
performance of the model.
Secondly, regulators  must  validate  the VAR  statistical  models  and  processes
which banks use to measure risk using the following qualitative standards:
*  there must exist senior management oversight and active involvement in the
process;
*  the model must be fully integrated into the daily risk management process;
*  risk management must be independent of the business line - that is, it must
belong to an autonomous risk control unit;
40  The main  advantage of  such  tests  is their  non-parametric  nature,  that  is they  do  not  depend  on
implausible statistical assumptions like normally distributed asset retums. The main disadvantage is that the
method implicitly assumes that historic volatilities and price movements will continue in the future, which
may be inappropriate. There is as yet no industry consensus on the optimal methodology for backtesting,
making it impossible to know whether a model has failed in a test because the model, and not the test itself,
was faulty. See Cox, "Magic and Regulation" in Risk magazine, Vol. 8, No. 3 (March 1995).24
*  controls over inputs, data, model changes, and systems must be strong;
*  the modeling system and the risk management process should be subject to an
adequate, independent validation by the bank or a third party. This  can be
based on either, or both, the adequacy of the VAR estimates - for example,
through  backtesting and stress tests - and the documentation of the  bank's
policies and procedures.
Finally, the bank must estimate overall VAR capital requirements on a daily basis.
As in the BSM approach, a third tier of eligible capital to cover market risks, made up of
short-term  subordinated debt  subject to  various  restrictions,  is  provided  here.  Stress
testing simulations are periodically going to be used in order to address concerns about
the complexity and opaqueness of derivative instruments risks.
There are also rules regarding banks which temporarily use a combination of the
BSM  and the IMA  approaches. The Basle Committee, despite setting no timetable,  is
keen to ensure that a bank which has developed one or more models will not be able to
revert to measuring the risk using the BSM approach, unless the supervisor withdraws
approval for the model.
1V.3. Analvsis
IV 3.1. Advantages of the IMA
The main advantages of the IMA, as proposed by the Basle Committee, are the
following:
*  it does not  generate excessive capital requirements for a widely diversified
book in the way that the simple BBA does;
*  it encourages sophisticated risk management by allowing the use of the same
internal  VAR  model  as  the  one  for  daily  operations,  and  by  rewarding
continuous improvement (by way of lower capital requirements) in the way
that models are built and risks are measured. By contrast, the CAD rules state
that European banks are allowed to submit their VAR figures only if they are
higher than the figures that would apply to them using the old BBA. This is
rarely  the  case, implying  that the  incentive to  improve  risk  measurement
systems is not there;25
*  the  supervisory task  may be  simplified compared  to  the  BBA,  since the
regulator  only has to  set the risk parameters and validate  each bank's  risk
assessment methodology. This argument is not universally acceptable though
because of the problems that validation poses (see Section IV.3.2. below);
*  it  allows  regulatory  risk  measures  to  evolve  at  the  same  time  as  risk
measurement techniques used in banks' VAR models.
IV 3.2. Criticisms of the IMA
However, there are also some problems with the IMA. Some of the assumptions
on which the approach is based have been challenged on various grounds 41. Firstly, the
regulators  may  find  it  extremely  difficult  to  evaluate  and  verify  the  accuracy  of
sophisticated  risk  management  models  - a  question  of  regulatory  transparency  and
capacity. Since there is no standard regulatory benchmark model, an ex ante approach to
validation is not possible. However, ex post verification through the comparison of the
bank's  prior risk estimate and the portfolio's  subsequent performance, is unappealing.
The reason is the low statistical power of such tests: is the violation a rare occurrence of a
low probability event that exceeds the size of an accurately estimated tail probability, or
is the bank's estimate of the probability of the event biased 42?
Secondly, extrapolation from single-day potential losses to  longer periods  does
not  adequately measure risk exposures. On the one hand, the process assumes a static
portfolio position. In reality, a trading desk would be constantly adjusting its portfolio to
reflect changing market conditions - the so-called endogeneity of trading  risk 43. Over
longer  periods  than  daily,  therefore,  it  is  unrealistic  to  assume  a  fixed  portfolio
composition, especially during periods of significant asset price volatility,  unless there
41  See Kupiec and O'Brien, "Internal Affairs" in Risk magazine, Vol. 8, No. 5 (May 1995).
42  The way the BIMA tried to resolve this problem was through the use of a large sample (one year of daily
data or 250 observation points) and probability analysis. Specifically, it estimated the probability that the
prediction of an accurate model would be wrongly classified as an exception at the 99% confidence level,
and set a maximum number of exceptions per year of backtesting, beyond which a 'plus  factor'  would be
activated.
43  Stop-loss limits, a dynamic trading strategy, are examples of active risk management which is ignored
here.26
has  been such  a  severe market  movement that  it  is  impossible to  liquidate  existing
positions (the so-called 'price gapping'), or enter into others (see Section V.2.2.).
On the other hand, there are two more problems with extrapolation, both of them
purely statistical. One is that the true short-run distribution of primitive asset returns -
those into which all positions are converted as units of measurement - is in practice not
normal. The other is that the returns on primitive assets may not time-aggregate in  a
uniform fashion across different asset categories. Both compromise the accuracy of long-
horizon risk estimates derived from one-day estimates. Moreover, option nonlinearities, if
not adequately captured, invalidate the linear measure of trading risk exposure implicit in
short-horizon risk measurement models due to curvature. It  should be noted, however,
that the criticisms of non-normality and curvature are not shortcomings of the models
themselves but of the attempt to  scale-up from linear, one-day VARs to the two-week
horizon44.
Thirdly, the various constraints imposed on banks'  internal models may create
perverse incentives for banks in two ways45:
*  they may lead, in the extreme, to a second set of models maintained only for
regulatory  risk-based  capital  determination.  This  would  allow  banks  to
'adjust'  the  constrained  models  in  order  to  minimize  their  capital
requirements. By micromanaging modeling, the IMA invites 'gaming'  by the
bank, in the same way that the BSM does;
- the choice of model parameters may be too  conservative for the bank  and
internally inconsistent. For example, the arbitrary choice of a large multiplier
number (3)  46,  which  came about  as a  compromise  figure by regulators  in
different countries, may impose unduly burdensome capital requirements on
most  banks 47. Moreover,  the proposed  ten-day holding  period  assumption
44  These weaknesses were recognized by the Basle Committee, which  allowed them in order  "to limit
industry burden". At the same time, however, the Committee has encouraged the switch by firms to a two-
week full revaluation of their portfolio positions in market shock model simulations.
45  See Bliss (September/October 1995), and Elderfield, "Capital Incentives" in Risk magazine, Vol. 8, No.
9 (September 1995).
46  Other examples include the choice of a sixty business day moving average of daily VAR calculations
and the imposition of an artificial floor on specific risk charges.
47  Research by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) Task Force has shown that the
core parameters of the capital set-aside alone provide enough capital cover of profit and  loss movements27
compromises  the  performance  of  meaningful backtesting.  It  will  then  be
natural for banks to respond by reducing their effective capital costs. This can
be done through the increase in their multiperiod risk relative to their daily
VARs - for instance by increasing the use of option securities with nonlinear
payoff - thereby gaming the regulations once again. Alternatively, they can
simply choose to forego the development of their own internal models in favor
of the BBA".
Fourthly,  the VAR  concept  itself focuses  solely  on  the  probability of  losses
greater than a specified amount but totally ignores how large those losses are expected to
be when they occur 49. Although the fixed VAR multiplier can be thought of as providing
an additional layer of prudence, designed to account for the extent of maximum losses, as
well  as for  possible market  illiquidity  and  for leptokurtotic  distributions  of financial
returns, the multiplier only addresses the average-loss distribution. This might not be so
bad in the sense that the regulators now clearly delineate a situation of extreme financial
stress, beyond which they can be expected to intervene. However, the system is open to
gaming since banks can invest in projects that trade slightly higher expected returns for
larger, though no more likely, potential losses.
Fifth,  adjustments  for  conservatism  are  reflected  in  many  of  the  BIMA's
quantitative constraints, even though not all VAR measurement shortcomings err on the
non-conservative side. This  does not lead to  a transparent risk measurement. Banks 50
have argued that, if regulators want to add conservatism, they should it with other means
for the  1987 stock market crash, the  1990 Gulf  War, the  1992 ERM crisis, and  the  1994 bond  market
decline.
4B  This concern is already present in the Financial Times survey of derivatives (16 November 1995): "The
reality for most UK banks is that the more traditional 'building block'  approach... will ultimately require a
smaller capital charge and therefore  prove a  cheaper alternative." (article by Richard  Irving  on shock-
absorbing  models). It is also confirmed in work done  by members of the London  investment  Banking
Association (LIBA) and of the ISDA.
49  Boudoukh, Richardson and Whitelaw, "Expect the Worst" in Risk magazine, Vol. 8, No. 9 (September
1995), suggest a measure related to stress testing, designed to measure maximum losses over a  holding
period, called 'worst-case scenario' analysis.
50  See J. P. Morgan (2 August 1995).28
- the  multiplication  factor,  the 'plus'  factor, or  the confidence interval  - but  not  by
artificially building in assumptions which are not the best estimate of the model.
Finally, if we are concerned with the calculation of VAR on a liquidation basis as
opposed to  a 'going  concern'  basis, VAR  can no  longer be used  with  confidence to
measure potential loss in the event of having to liquidate positions. The reason is that the
liquidation  horizon  for  any position  cannot be  arbitrarily  set,  as  assumed  under  the
51 conventional VAR measure, but depends on the costs of liquidation
IV 3.3. Conclusion
The IMA as proposed by the Basle Committee, and despite the adoption of the
multiplication  factor,  is  an  improvement  over  the  BBA  since  it  caters  to  financial
institutions'  best practices by adopting their internal VAR models in the measurement of
regulatory capital set-asides. To date, however, very few major banks carry full VAR
models which include a complete matrix of correlations, because of the cost of setting up
such internal systems. A combination of stress tests and VAR models on individual lines
of business will continue to be the main instruments of trading book risk measurement, in
order to compare against bank capital, for most banks for some time to come.
51  See Lawrence and Robinson, "Liquid Measures" in Risk magazine, Vol. 8, No. 7 (July 1995).29
V. THE  PRECOMMITMEMI  APPROACH
V.I. Description'u
V 1.1. Overall Description
An alternative to  models-based regulation, the PA  focuses on goals  - namely,
maintaining sufficient capital to cover trading losses - and leaves it to banks to determine
the best models and inputs to achieve those goals. It is a relatively new idea in the field of
regulation of market risk, floated by the Federal Reserve, and its specific mechanisms
have not yet been set out in detail.
Under this approach, each bank pre-commits an amount of capital to cover what is
believed to be its maximum trading loss exposure over a given regulatory horizon, which
can be one quarter or even a shorter period. This capital becomes the focus of regulation.
A  bank  would  be  in  breach  of  this  precommitment  if  cumulative  losses  from  the
beginning of the capital period exceeded its capital commitment on any close of business
mark-to-market  within  the quarter.  Banks that  have  good risk  management  systems,
conservative  portfolios,  or  more  risk  averse  preferences,  could  precommit  to  lower
maximum loss levels and hold less capital because of their confidence that they will not
breach their precommitted maximum trading losses.
V 1.2. The Nature of the Penalties
Breaches  would  be  penalized  in  two  ways.  Firstly,  there  would  be  explicit
regulatory penalties. Secondly, the commitment could be publicly disclosed, providing a
double incentive for the bank - to contain losses within its committed capital and to not
greatly  over-commit  capital.  The  latter  may  send  a  signal  of  an  ineffective  risk
measurement  system, as well as of possible  excessive risk  exposure in the upcoming
52  See Kupiec  and O'Brien,  "Model Alternative"  in Risk magazine, Vol. 8, No. 6  (June  1995); Bliss
(September/October 1995); and Kupiec and O'Brien (December 1995).30
period 53. It  also  encourages the regulatory authorities to  act promptly  over  breaches,
imposing the necessary penalties and determining management shortcomings. Disclosure
therefore both complements and strengthens the incentives created by the penalties54
A number of regulatory punishment methods, individually or in combination, are
envisaged, depending on the situation, if trading losses exceed banks'  market risk capital
precommitments:
*  a fine penalty;
*  an  additional capital penalty. For example, banks could be required to hold
capital in excess of their loss pre-commitments in subsequent periods. This
has been criticized, though, on the grounds that it causes banks to respond to
such a violation penalty by taking measures to nullify it55;
*  depending on the severity of the problem, supervisory actions could include
less  formal penalties such as supervisory sanctions. These could  include a
detailed review of the bank's risk management system, increased backtesting,
close monitoring  of  activities,  and  even restrictions  on  trading  activity  or
permitted risk exposure.
All penalties should have the important characteristic that they increase nonlinearly with
56 the size of the violation  . This requirement provides disincentives to deferring today's
losses in the hope that future outcomes will reverse them, in an apparent attempt to 'bail
the boat'.
Of course, in times of unusual financial market stress situations - for example,
systemic crises  - no reasonable capital commitment can fulfill those risks. Regulators
53  This means that, for a bank which has excess regulatory capital, the implied cost of that capital is not
zero, though it is probably less than the cost of penalties. The end result is that the banks will choose to be
conservative.
54  The usefulness of  public disclosure has  been questioned  by  market practitioners  who believe  that
disclosed penalties might  lead to market overreaction, which  will cause runs  on those banks  that have
breached their precommitment.
55  For example, the bank could reduce next period's  precommitment or increase the risk of its portfolio.
Since precommitments are worst-case scenarios, actual violations would be rare and gaming therefore hard
to detect.
56  See Bliss (September/October 1995).31
must therefore have the flexibility to waive penalties during those times. The issue of
setting a penalty function becomes all-important for regulators since it sets the tone of
incentives for  compliance. In particular, that function must  have the characteristic  of
perfect incentive compatibility, thus avoiding over- or under-commitment of capital.
Moreover, the multiplier used to determine capital set-aside from precommitted
maximum losses need not be fixed at unity. While the system is being implemented, and
until  enough  experience  is  gathered,  a  higher  initial  multiplier  would  provide  an
additional degree of safety. This precaution may be dispensed with time, though it cannot
be used as an incentive device since it encourages gaming in the same fashion as capital
penalties described above.
V.2. Analysis
V.  2.1. Advantages of the PA
The  precommitment  approach  has  a  number  of  significant  advantages  when
compared to the other two approaches:
3  it explicitly recognizes the role of risk management in determining a bank's
market  risk  exposure  over  a  relatively  lengthy  period.  It  does  that  by
accounting for both the static internal model-based risk estimates, as well as
active risk management during that period;
*  it allegedly removes the need for supervisors to verify the accuracy of a bank's
loss estimates. Its incentive structure uses the bank's  self-interest to  allocate
appropriate capital and develop risk management systems. It therefore places
the difficult task of assessing the maximum potential loss on the party best
able to  estimate  and  control it  - bank  management. This  argument  is not
robust, however, since there are questions about the verification process (see
Section below);
*  it is flexible, though explicit, as to the type of penalty imposed. Penalties are
an incentive device and a device for imposing costs in proportion to regulatory
risk.  They  make  explicit  and  bank-specific the  costs  that  one-size-fits-all
models-based approaches impose on banks;
*  it compares favorably with the work hours required for implementing either of
the two previous  approaches. Reporting should not  be  costly, as the  bank
would simply announce only two numbers: its gains/losses for the previous
period and its precommitment for the next period.32
V 2.2. Disadvantages of the PA
The following are the main disadvantages of the PA:
because penalties are applied ex post  and only  in  the event of  losses, the
approach  does  not  protect  against  a  'go  for  broke'  strategy.  In  addition,
precommitment suffers from verification problems through backtesting which
are even worse than  those  of  the BIMA  because  of the  lack  of  plentiful
observations available 57. Precommitment could, therefore, potentially  impose
penalties on a bank that a priori had set an appropriate capital commitment
and had managed its trading risk very well. That is why the regulatory period
should be as short as possible, in order to make it difficult for banks that have
excessive losses early in the period to try to reduce them by undertaking more
risky positions. Moreover, it is up to bank regulators to identify in advance
banks for whom penalties would not act as a deterrent;
*  a specific proposal linking the cost of regulatory capital to the bank has not
yet been articulated. This is an important issue, since the same penalty, as well
as the regulatory capital commitment, will cost differently for different banks,
depending on, among other things, the bank's leverage ratio;
n  precommitment, though  still relying on the authorities'  safety net, removes
from supervisors the authority to determine instances beyond the capacity of
the industry's  capital base to absorb - that is, a situation of unusual financial
stress - because firms are free to choose all quantitative parameters;
*  precommitment assumes that there is a time frame large enough for losses to
be recouped by management through various stop-loss strategies. While this is
appropriate for ordinary trading days, it was not the main  objective of the
Basle Committee in establishing market risk capital. Instead, the Committee's
intention was to tackle instantaneous market shocks, when market  liquidity
evaporates and there is little opportunity for stop-loss trade. In fact, trying to
execute  such  a  strategy  can  be  counterproductive  by  actually  increasing
systemic risk, as was shown in the 1987 Wall Street crash. Precommitment, by
encouraging  a  bank  to  rely  more  on  stop-loss behavior  in  order  to  limit
cumulative losses, can actually increase systemic risk.
57 The standard PA proposal assesses penalties only once a quarter, in contrast to the daily observations for
the BIMA. That gives it a much smaller sample on which to base its verification procedure.33
V2.3. Conclusion
The PA  represents a  substantial  break from  past proposals  since, in  its  broad
methodology, it is more market-oriented and incentive-compatible than the previous two
approaches. This could potentially reduce the distortions introduced by the application of
capital-based regulations in the marketplace. There are severe doubts, however, about its
operational parameters  (type of penalties)  and  implications  in  achieving the aims  of
regulation, which need to be addressed before it can be practically useful. In any case,
there are very few banks nowadays with the technological capability of sophisticated risk
measurement  and  management  systems  which  can  be  relied  on  for  precommitment
purposes, questioning the approach's relevance, at least for the near future.34
VI. CONCLUSION
VI. 1. Evaluation of the Three Approaches to Regulating Market Risk
Regulators traditionally have utilized simple, generic models  to  measure bank
capital adequacy. This is no longer possible: the increased presence of market risk in
banks, and the opaqueness of such risk in a portfolio, have rendered such an approach
obsolete.  Three main  alternative approaches, outlined  in this  paper, have emerged  to
replace it. An evaluation of them is based on an assessment of the extent to which they
fulfill  the  objectives  of  bank  regulation  subject  to  the  competitive  neutrality  and
efficiency constraints. Each approach must therefore be judged on the tradeoff between
the prevention  of the costs of bank  failures, and the costs of implementation of  such
regulations.
In a first-best world, appropriate measurement of risk, which would incorporate
58 all four types of it, of the whole institution in accordance with a portfolio approach
should precede the setting of risk-based capital standards. That time has not come yet,
though all three approaches move towards that direction; we therefore have to continue to
resort to piecemeal regulatory capital requirements.
The VAR concept can potentially be applied to both credit and market risk, thus
allowing for the possibility that, in time, banks may be able to have a single firm-wide
measure of those risks across all business areas, and so measure return on (credit and
market) risk consistently across the whole firm. The concept, however, is no substitute for
the wider  risk management process of analyzing stress scenarios and  keeping tabs  on
operational and legal risks. For example, neither  the VAR, nor any  of the  other two
approaches, offers a direct solution to the problem of operating risk - the existence of
sloppy internal controls - which has been responsible for many of the recent scandals
involving derivatives.
In addition, a number of complementary reforms must also take place in order to
reach the  first-best solution,  including  the  implementation of  a  cohesive  accounting
5S  See Dimson and Marsh (July 1995).35
framework59  and the switch in financial regulation towards a functional, as opposed to an
institutional, perspective 60. The CAD is an example of functional regulation at a broad
level because it regulates similar activities between securities firms and banks, though
there are questions about the wisdom of doing that (see Section 111.3.1  .).  However, at a
narrower  level,  it  ignores  the market  risk  found  in  the  banking book  and,  with  the
exception of forex risk, it focuses exclusively on the trading book.
The building bloc approach is problematic because it is inflexible, and thereby
inefficient in accurately measuring risk, and static. By focusing on the classification of
61 instruments rather than risk  types  ,  it distorts different instruments'  attractiveness,  it
ignores portfolio principles of diversification and correlation hedging, and it encourages
substantial  gaming. It has to be  admitted though that, based on the experience of the
credit  standards  introduced  in  1988, the willingness  of  countries  to  implement  risk
standards  may  be  positively  related to  their  relative  simplicity,  notwhistanding  the
unrealistic assumptions they may involve.
The internal model approach is an improvement to the BBA, since it is aligned to
bank industry best practice, the use of internal VAR models. However, the attempt by
regulators to create consistent estimates of VAR across different institutions'  models, as
well as their conservative parameters, have reduced the approach's appeal. In addition, at
least in the near future, its application will be limited to a relatively  small number of
institutions  (about 25  in  the USA, according to  the Federal Register) that  have both
material trading activities and sophisticated, comprehensive VAR models.
59  Current accounting principles (more  than practices) do  a good job  at valuation,  inherently a  static
measure  of financial conditions.  However, they  are totally inadequate to  deal with risk allocation  and
exposure, which is of critical concern nowadays.
60  See  Merton  (April  1995). He  argues  that  regulation  organized  along  functions,  as  opposed  to
institutional  categories  of  products  or  asset  types,  would  be  operationally  more  effective  and
comprehensive. The reason is that it will be increasinigly  more difficult and distortionary to regulate along
traditional institutional lines because the flexibility in contract designs would by-pass those regulations.
61 As seen in Section 1.2., in order to calculate the true market risk of a particular institution under some
confidence  interval,  it  is  necessary to  disaggregate  income  down  from  individual transactions  to  its
fundamental  elements,  and  then  aggregate them  up  again while  taking  into account  any  correlations
between different risks.36
In contrast to the first two approaches which support model-based regulation, the
precommitment approach by-passes the micro-management of banks'  models, focusing
instead on outputs. If appropriate incentive-compatible penalties are found, the incentives
for gaming by banks, present in different ways and extent in both BBA and IMA (and all
financial regulations), are significantly reduced. It is necessary though for the PA to be
further examined and refined, given the severe doubts that still exist over the implications
of its adoption in practice.
In conclusion, given the current inability to develop measures which capture an
institution's  overall portfolio risks, the use of piece-meal regulatory capital requirements,
such as the one for market risk, should continue. Of the aforementioned approaches, the
internal model approach is, for the time being, the most reliable, market-friendly, and
effective method that can be eventually achieved for most banks.
VI.2. Business Implications of the New Market Risk Rules
VI.  2.1. Dimensions of Assessment
There are a number of potential business implications arising from the new market
risk rules, though they are still tentative in nature 62. The implications arise primarily out
of the implementation of the BBA, through the CAD and the BSM, and to a lesser extent
from  the  IMA.  They  can  be  seen  in  three  dimensions:  capital,  competition,  and
profitability and pricing decisions of banks.
VI.2.2. Implications  for Capital
With  respect  to  capital,  the  initial  reaction  of  many  banks  and  of  the  EU
Commission has been that the application of the new rules will not result in significantly
increased levels of capital, in contrast to the implementation of the Basle Accord of 1988
for credit risk. For banks, the existing rules for credit risk will continue to be the primary
rules determining the overall regulatory effect. This is because of two reasons.
62  See Price Waterhouse (1994).37
Firstly, despite the recent growth in banks'  market-related activities, the size of
banks' market exposures is generally small relative to traditional credit-related exposures.
Secondly, regulatory capital requirements for market risk do not appear to be as binding
as those for credit risk were - banks empirically seem to already hold back enough capital
for trading book activities, perhaps because of their still uncertain and evolving models of
market risk pricing. Most banks would be expected to meet their regulatory capital needs
from share capital and other long term sources. Indeed, the unavoidable systems costs of
adapting to the new regime may prove the main business issue.
VI.  2.3. Implications for  Competition
With respect to competition under the BBA, the key issue is the flexibility with
which regulators in different countries will police the trading book/banking book divide
to ensure neutrality, in capital terms, between banks and investment firms. Geographical
and other factors will limit the ability of financial institutions for regulatory arbitrage.
However,  given  the  crudeness  of  the  different  risk  charges  for  different
instruments embodied in the BBA, it is probable that niche players and small independent
firms, depending on the types of investment services they provide and consequently the
risk exposures they are involved with, are likely to face onerous capital requirements. It is
the biggest trading banks with the most well-developed risk measurement systems that
stand to gain the most, though not the extent that they would like, given the conservative
parameters imposed  on  their  models by  regulators. Barriers  to  entry for  proprietary
trading in banks will therefore increase. Moreover, the cost of regulatory  capital will
increase the pace of banks'  search for new non-capital consuming lines of business and
thereby increase the level of competition in these areas.
It is unlikely, however, that any accord on capital can have a major impact on
competition  among  banks  in  different  countries.  Such  competition  is  determined
primarily by differences in comparative advantage, the fundamentals of each economy,
and  government  support  in the  form  of  safety  net policies,  and  not  by  pre-existing
differences in capital ratios. As with the Basle credit risk accord, the new market risk
capital  requirements cannot  be justified,  or judged,  mainly  on  competition-enhancing38
grounds - the leveling out of the playing field - but rather on their effects in strengthening
the safety and soundness of the banking system, both nationally and internationally. It is
true though that, depending on the original bank organizational structure and regulatory
framework in place, the effect of the imposition of these capital rules might differ63
VI.  2.4. Implications for Profitability and Pricing
With respect to profitability and pricing, the new rules will add to the costs  of
most  firms conducting  securities business, particularly in  the installation  of new  risk
measurement and internal control systems. A firm may have to overhaul and reorganize
its IT systems in order to be able to ensure compatibility and information-sharing across
all  its,  perhaps  worldwide,  offices.  However,  if  this  will  also  confer  the  firm  a
competitive  advantage,  or  is  necessary  because  of  increasing  globalization  and
competition,  then  the  costs  would  have been  incurred  anyway,  and  might  even  be
recouped through better risk pricing or greater market share.
However, firms' pricing decisions are the result of a multitude of factors, of which
regulatory capital is only one. It is not therefore expected that pricing policies are going
to be substantially altered upon the implementation of these rules.
63  For example, a US bank holding group would probably suffer greater costs applying the Basle BBA to
its  consolidated accounts (in  addition to the application  of  the SEC's  Comprehensive Approach  to  its
securities affiliate), than a German universal bank in keeping the same standard.Or~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~'
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